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introDuction
this volu�e includes essays presented at the conference on Emotions and Rational-ity in Moral Philosophy held at the universities of neuchâtel and Bern in october 
2005. The authors of this volu�e share the hu�ean insight that the ‘senti�ents’ have 
a crucial role to play in elucidating the practice of �orality. in a hu�ean fashion, they 
warn us against taking an intellectualist view of e�otions and reject the rationalist 
account of �orality. in contrast to hu�e, however, or at least in contrast to so�e in-
terpretation of hu�e’s �oral philosophy, so�e contributors to this volu�e are opti-
�istic with regard to the weight our e�otions and e�otional dispositions should play 
in �oral theorising. 
in his What Is Wrong With Reid’s Criticism of Hume on Moral Approbation? laurent 
Ja��ro replies to reid’s objections against hu�e’s senti�entalis�. Ja��ro argues that be-
cause reid uncharitably takes hu�e’s �oral theory to be a contribution to an analy-
sis of the ordinary �eaning of �oral judge�ent, he �isses his target. hu�e see�s 
to be �ore concerned with the �etaphysical reality of �oral judg�ents; the feelings 
that underscore the� are such that they are suited to explain why we are �otivated to 
act accordingly, but being what they are, i.e. non-intentional states, they are not suit-
able candidates for representing �oral facts. according to Ja��ro, this view is entirely 
co�patible with the idea that people usually think that their �oral judg�ents ai� at 
capturing an objective reality. Ja��ro goes as far as suggesting that hu�e is an early ad-
vocate of Mackie’s “error theory” (1977) with regard to the evaluative. This is a strong 
suggestion since it attributes to hu�e the thought that people’s �oral assertions are 
truth-evaluable and always false.
it is worth noting here that neither in hu�e’s, nor in reid’s accounts of �oral judge-
�ents �ay one be held accountable for one’s e�otions or for the actions caused by 
the�. indeed, both contrast feeling (a kind of sensation with no cognitive content and 
no intentionality) and judg�ent sharply; and stress the �erely qualitative character of 
the for�er. They di��er in that hu�e thinks that �oral evaluation is a �atter of non-in-
tentional feelings to the exclusion of the �oral judge�ent that acco�panies it; whereas 
reid thinks that it is a �atter of �oral judge�ent to the exclusion of the non-inten-
tional feelings that are caused by it. in both cases however the role played by e�otions 
in �orality re�ains in a way peripheral (at least in connection with �oral theorising 
and responsibility).
another the�e deriving fro� Ja��ro’s analysis of hu�e and reid is that even if both 
shared the sa�e notion of feeling, they held very di��erent views about the nature of 
e�otions. for reid, they are co�posed of an a��ective ingredient (a feeling) and a cog-
nitive ingredient (a judg�ent), where the first is caused by the second. for hu�e, in-
stead, an e�otion is a co�plex state not clearly defined. here Ja��ro see�s (although not 
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explicitly) to suggest that hu�e defended what has beco�e in conte�porary debates 
a way of conceiving of e�otions: an “a��ective judge�ent” (see Goldie 2000; Döring 
forthco�ing). What strikes us is how the distinction between reid and hu�e’s con-
ceptions of e�otions parallels conte�porary debate opposing the “a��ective judge�ent 
view”, and what peter Goldie labels “add-on views” (according to which an e�otion is a 
judg�ent to which we add a further separate but not essential co�ponent: a feeling).
in her Responsibility for others’ Emotions sophie rietti argues against the over-intel-
lectualisation of e�otions, as developed by the late ro�an stoics and still defended by 
so�e conte�porary philosophers. for her, e�otions can not be understood as evalu-
ative judge�ents over which we have full voluntary control, a significant consequence 
of this position being that we are entirely responsible for our own, but not for other 
people’s, e�otions. rietti o��ers argu�ents against the stoic �odel, showing how it 
relies on an unrealistic picture of the hu�an agent conceived as self-sufficient being, 
and on an unacceptable understanding of e�otions as cognitive judg�ents. further, 
on the basis of evidence fro� sociological studies, she suggests – in opposition to the 
stoics – that, to a certain extent, it is possible to �anage our own as well as others’ e�o-
tions, hence being accountable for the�. however, she leaves open the question as to 
how responsibility for others’ e�otions should be attributed; as she argues, there is no 
straightforward answer, for �uch will depend on issues outside the scope of her paper. 
nevertheless, rietti’s analysis �akes it clear that, to a certain extent, the issue of moral 
responsibility can depend on a conception of e�otions (cognitive versus a��ective co�-
ponents of e�otion; possibility to regulate our e�otions, etc.).
in her Autonomy and the Emotions, christine tappolet puts into question the rational-
ist view at a deeper level; she atte�pts to free the concept of responsibility itself, as well 
as close notions such as freedo� and autono�y, fro� a non-e�otive construal of the�. 
hence, the proble� she focuses on is not – as in rietti’s project – with the responsibil-
ity we have over our e�otions or that of other people, but the �oral responsibility we 
have over actions caused by e�otions. her clai� is that there are cases where we can 
act �orally and fully autono�ously out of e�otions even if our e�otions incite us to 
act against our best judg�ent. hence, against rationalist accounts, she argues that self-
control exercised by the agent’s best rational judg�ents over his desires and other first-
order appetites is not a necessary condition for autono�y. relying on frankfurt’s and 
shoe�aker’s work, tappolet proposes to cast autono�y as inti�ately related to who we 
are, to what we wholeheartedly identify ourselves with, �ore precisely, to what we care 
about – where care has to be understood as a set of e�otional dispositions. roughly, an 
action can be autono�ous si�ply because it has been caused by a care that is central to 
who we are, independently of whether the agent consciously agrees with it at the stage 
of action. Therefore, actions caused by e�otions, even if they are contrary to our best 
judg�ent, �ight turn out to be autono�ous. a consequence of this view is that it be-
co�es possible to act autono�ously while acting irrationally. since actions and choices 
are expressions of our character, tappolet’s conception of responsibility di��ers fro� 
rietti in that it does not involve being capable of acting otherwise.
like tappolet, in his Moral Emotions, Principles, and the Locus of Moral Perception, Jo-
sep corbí is interested in the notion of character (‘who we are’) in the context of �oral 
behaviour and decision �aking. he argues against the view that �oral principles are 
necessary or at least sufficient for �oral deliberation. his clai� is that appeal to prin-
ciples does not �ake sense of everyday deliberation because it does not take into ac-
count the agent’s character, which is an essential ele�ent in deliberating. corbí’s project 
is to satisfactorily characterise �oral deliberation fro� a first-person perspective. since 
it is a particular agent who faces particular situations, the �oral deliberation needs to 
be conditioned by his projects, a��ections, and co��it�ents. further, on corbí’s view, 
in any given �orally significant situation, it is the agent’s character which is relevant 
for deter�ining how he ought to respond to these particular situations. in this picture, 
guilt plays a crucial role as it is an e�otion which he takes to be central to the idea of 
character. Guilt – conceived of as an inner voice shaped through a process of accultura-
tion and personal experiences – has nor�ative significance because it fixes the agent’s 
‘active (but particular) oughts’.
as tappolet, corbì endorses a conception of �orality in which our e�otional disposi-
tions play a central role; although where tappolet e�phasises our capacity for caring, 
corbì focuses on our capacity for guilt. further, �any passages of corbí’s article can 
be seen as constituting a possible way of expanding on so�ething which is particularly 
relevant to rietti’s project: how are our e�otions shaped through socialisation? corbí’s 
version, with its freudian overtones, �ight not be one that will satisfy rietti’s need, but 
it indicates one way in which her project can be elaborated. Moreover, corbì’s particu-
laris� is congenial to the way rietti �akes ascription of responsibility sensitive to the 
various ways and circu�stances in which we do in fact attribute responsibility. 
a�ong our e�otions, self-love see�s to be especially proble�atic and yet especially 
central. it is a vexed question whether self-love is conducive to �orality or an obsta-
cle to it. partly, the answer to this question depends on the status of this e�otion. in 
his Two Approaches to Self-Love: Hucheson and Butler Maurer addresses this issue by 
contrasting hutcheson’s and Butler’s account of self-love. although both philosophers 
clai�ed that self-love pro�otes interest, they did not share the sa�e conception of the 
notion of interest. as a consequence, they propose two alternative conceptions of self-
love. hutcheson defines self-love as a source of hedonistic �otives and desires – and 
thus not particularly �orally reco��endable – whereas Butler conceives of it as a kind 
of love for one’s self, a self understood in ter�s of an individual’s real nature – which 
�akes of self-love a part of �orality itself. for Butler, self-love is a general a��ection 
that ai�s at the agent’s happiness, where happiness has to be understood in a non-he-
donistic way (it is not an equivalent to pleasure). More specifically, self-love is said to 
be interested in a teleological, and not in a hedonistic sense, because the agent’s interest 
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is not for the gratification of a present passion or desire but for the realisation of what 
is good for his nature as a hu�an being. further�ore, Butler defends the idea that be-
nevolence is a co�ponent of hu�an nature. This way of conceiving of the notions of in-
terest and hu�an nature allows Butler to think of self-love as naturally co�patible with 
benevolence: self-love is a general a��ection that pro�pts one to follow the particular 
co��ands of benevolence. in other words, self-love pro�otes actions that are for the 
good of hu�an nature, actions ste��ing both fro� benevolent or social a��ections as 
well as those ste��ing fro� the appetites that allow self-preservation.
This the�e echoes so�e of tappolet’s re�arks. as we have seen, she endorses the view 
that free and autono�ous actions out of e�otions ste� fro� our central cares, the ones 
that ground the kind of person we are. further, as she puts it, our �ost central cares 
are those that have developed naturally, those that are not the result of �anipulations. 
now, Butler’s self-love �ight precisely help us discover our real selves, that is: reveal 
our strongest cares, our funda�ental e�otional dispositions (the one that should be 
realised). although she does not address this question in her paper, this idea �ight not 
please tappolet since Butler’s self-love can only proceed out of an already given “real 
nature”, whereas tappolet’s �ain source of inspiration is frankfurt who has developed 
the idea that we actively for� our cares during the course of our lives by �eans of a 
first-personal quest for volitional unity (frankfurt 1999). further, it is questionable 
whether this quest for volitional unity is co�patible with Butler’s conception of real 
nature since – as explained in Maurer’s article – it leaves �ore roo� for the cultivation 
of selfish �otives. 
The articles contained in this issue challenge a crude rationalist view on two fronts. The 
first concerns the way to conceive e�otions; �ore precisely, the question of the respec-
tive role of the feeling co�ponent and the cognitive co�ponent in e�otions. rietti 
refutes the idea that e�otions are nothing but judg�ents entirely subject to our volun-
tary control; while Ja��ro’s analysis is infused with a discreet critical tone, urging against 
taking too �uch of an intellectualist, as well as an “add-on view”, of e�otions (see his 
argu�ents against reid). The second front relates to the notion of the �orally relevant. 
Butler’s idea of real �oral nature revealed by self-love, as well as corbí’s and tappolet’s 
conviction that our choices and actions ste� fro� guilt (corbí) and e�otional disposi-
tions (tappolet), can be seen as freeing �orality fro� a too restrictive conception i.e. 
fro� a strictly rationalist construal. in particular, tappolet and corbí are opti�istic 
with regard to the i�portance played by our e�otions and e�otional dispositions in 
shaping our �oral choices and – here also in contrast to hu�e – in guiding our �oral 
deliberations; our e�otions in general do not only deter�ine what �akes it true that 
we are �oral creatures; they are also intentional states, or ground intentional states, 
which represent the world in evaluative ways that �ight succeed or not succeed in 
representing this evaluative world correctly.
although �ost contributions to this volu�e o��er cogent argu�ents against crude 
for�s of rationalis� with regard to �orality and the e�otions, none argue that reason-
ing and reasons are outside the scope of the �orally relevant. for exa�ple, irrespec-
tively of the specific views defended by any of our authors, it �ight still be clai�ed that 
e�otions are for�s of apprehensions of reasons in ways that are still to be elucidated. 
The �erit of the present articles is to provide co��on ground for further investigation 
in �oral psychology and �eta-ethics.
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